How Conservative Justices Are Undertermining Our Democracy (or What\u27s at Stake in Choosing Justice Scalia by Garfield, Alan E
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 92
Issue 5 The Supplement Article 4
2017
How Conservative Justices Are Undertermining
Our Democracy (or What's at Stake in Choosing
Justice Scalia
Alan E. Garfield
Delaware Law School, aegarfield@widner.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Judges Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Garfield, Alan E. (2017) "How Conservative Justices Are Undertermining Our Democracy (or What's at Stake in Choosing Justice
Scalia," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 92 : Iss. 5 , Article 4.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol92/iss5/4
How Conservative Justices Are  
Undermining Our Democracy  
(or What’s at Stake in Choosing Justice Scalia’s Successor?) 
ALAN E. GARFIELD* 
In this essay, Professor Garfield contends that the conservative justices on the 
Supreme Court have allowed elected officials to manipulate laws to entrench 
themselves in office and to disenfranchise voters who threaten their power. The 
justices’ unwillingness to curb these abuses has largely redounded to the benefit of 
the Republican Party because Republicans control the majority of state legislatures 
and have used this power to gerrymander legislative districts and to enact 
voter-suppressive laws such as voter ID laws. With Justice Antonin Scalia’s 
unexpected passing during the administration of a Democratic president, the 
conservatives’ control of the Court has been put into play. While the media and 
presidential candidates have focused on the implications of a shifting Court majority 
for individual rights, it is likely that, behind the scenes, politicians are much more 
focused on the implications of a shifting majority for their ability to hold onto power.  
INTRODUCTION 
Ever since Marbury v. Madison,1 the central question of constitutional law has 
been how judges should wield their power of judicial review. The answer is complex 
because judicial review conflicts with democratic self-governance. In a democracy, 
one expects citizens to set policy through their elected representatives. When 
unelected justices override the people’s representatives, the result is problematic. As 
Alexander Bickel famously observed, it creates a “counter-majoritarian difficulty.”2 
Of course, this counter-majoritarian check is essential for protecting rights that 
would otherwise get trammeled in a majoritarian political process. Judicial review 
can protect minority groups and dissenting voices from the tyranny of the majority.3 
It can ensure that those who have little public sympathy, like criminal defendants, 
are treated fairly. Judicial review also ensures that the Constitution’s structural limits 
on power are respected (e.g., so members of Congress can’t triple the lengths of their 
terms without a constitutional amendment).   
But most policy decisions in a democracy should be made by the people and their 
elected representatives, not nine unelected justices. Otherwise, the people will have 
ceded to the judiciary their most precious civil liberty: “the freedom to govern 
themselves.”4 
                                                                                                                 
 
 *  Professor of Law, Delaware Law School. The author is grateful, as he always is, to 
his unfailingly generous colleague and editor exemplar, Laura Krugman Ray. 
 1.  5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 2.  ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16–18 (2d ed. 1986). 
 3.  Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 671 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Minorities trampled on by the 
democratic process have recourse to the courts: the recourse is called constitutional law.”), 
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014). 
 4.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2627 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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The justices abuse their power when they overturn decisions that are rightfully 
left to the people. Recognizing this, the justices have created a multitude of doctrines 
to restrain their power. Sometimes they say that an issue is nonjusticiable and avoid 
it altogether.5 Other times, they hear an issue but apply deferential “rational basis” 
scrutiny to uphold laws, even if they personally believe the laws to be “unwise” or 
“improvident.”6 This passivity is not an evasion of judicial responsibility. It simply 
acknowledges the justices’ limited role in a democracy. As Justice Louis Brandeis 
wisely said, “[t]he most important thing we do is not doing.”7 
Yet even in areas reserved to the majoritarian political process, the justices still 
have a role to play. They should not second-guess the people’s policy choices, but 
they should intervene when laws prevent the political process from functioning 
properly. After all, judicial deference to the political process makes sense only if the 
process is legitimate.8  The justices need to be on guard for actions that distort the 
process. 
This is John Hart Ely’s “representation-reinforcing” theory of judicial review.9 
Under this theory, judicial intervention is appropriate to ensure the proper 
functioning of our democracy. For example, democracy works only if people can 
speak freely and act collectively. Judicial intervention is, therefore, justified to 
invalidate laws that interfere with freedom of speech or association.10  
Unfortunately, the conservative justices on the Supreme Court have been using 
their power of judicial review not to reinforce democracy but to undermine it. They 
have failed to intervene when intervention has been necessary to protect the integrity 
of the political process (most notably in failing to correct for extreme partisan 
gerrymandering and vote-suppressing voter ID laws), and they have misguidedly 
used their power to strike down laws that improved the democratic process (most 
notably in invalidating the Voting Rights Act preclearance procedure and laws that 
curb the influence of money in politics).11 
Of course, the conservative justices do not always vote in unison.  Justice Anthony 
Kennedy has occasionally joined the Court’s four liberal justices to produce opinions 
that reinforce democracy. But, more often than not, Kennedy and his conservative 
colleagues have formed a slim 5/4 majority that has, with disturbing consistency, 
issued decisions that have undermined our democracy. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 5.  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 47–51 (5th ed. 2015). 
 6.  Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955). 
 7.  ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 17 
(1967); see also BICKEL, supra note 2, at 71.  
 8.  United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that 
the Supreme Court will give greater scrutiny to “legislation which restricts those political 
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about the repeal of undesirable 
legislation”). 
 9.  JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 87 (1980); see also David A. Strauss, 
Modernization and Representation Reinforcement: An Essay in Memory of John Hart Ely, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 761, 761 (2004) (describing John Hart’s Ely “simple, powerful thesis” that 
“judges should try to make representative democracy more democratic”).  
 10.  ELY, supra note 9, at 93–94, 105–16. 
 11.  See Part I; Part II.  
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Cumulatively, the conservative justices’ decisions have eroded our democracy’s 
foundation. Their decisions have permitted politicians to impede the machinery 
through which political change occurs by allowing elected officials to draw district 
lines that virtually ensure their reelection and, as if that were not enough, by enacting 
laws that disenfranchise voters who are likely to oppose them.  
What makes the actions of these supposedly neutral justices (the ones who merely 
“call balls and strikes”) so troubling is that they have almost uniformly redounded to 
the benefit of conservative politicians.12 That’s because Republicans control the 
majority of state legislatures and have used this control to gerrymander legislative 
districts and to enact voter ID and other laws that disenfranchise Democratic-leaning 
poor and minority voters.13 
With the passing of Justice Antonin Scalia, control of the Supreme Court is now 
up for grabs. If a liberal justice replaces Scalia, the Court is likely to reverse course 
and start using its judicial power to reinforce, rather than undermine, our democracy. 
If a conservative justice replaces Scalia, the Court is likely to continue on its current 
course. 
Presidential candidates and the popular media have focused on the implications 
of a Scalia replacement for individual rights. Conservatives have warned that the 
people’s right to bear arms and to exercise religious freedoms will be jeopardized if 
a liberal replaces Scalia.14 Liberals have warned that a conservative appointment 
could threaten rights to an abortion and same-sex marriage.15 
But the fierce political battle between President Obama and Senate Republicans 
over replacing Scalia may have less to do with social issues and more to do with the 
political ramifications of the new appointment. Matters like campaign financing, 
partisan gerrymandering, voter ID laws, and the scope of the Voting Rights Act 
dramatically affect who gets to hold onto power in Washington and in state capitals. 
Given these stakes, it’s hardly surprising that Senate Republicans have refused to 
even consider Merrick Garland, President Obama’s nominee to replace Justice 
Scalia.16 
                                                                                                                 
 
 12.  Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice 
of the United States Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55–56 (2007) (statement 
of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States).  
 13. 2014 State and Legislative Partisan Composition, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES 
(June 9, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/statevote/legiscontrol_2014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2LYT-E95S]. 
 14.  David Sherfinski, Supreme Court is One Liberal Justice Away from Killing Second 
Amendment: Cruz, THE WASH. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2016), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/feb/19/cruz-1-liberal-justice-away-killing-2nd-
amendment/?utm_source=RSS_Feed [https://perma.cc/QA36-8QLL] (quoting presidential 
candidate Ted Cruz as saying country is one justice away from losing its right to bear arms 
and its religious freedom). 
 15.  See, e.g., Nina Liss-Schultz, Scalia’s Death Might Have Saved Abortion Rights, 
MOTHER JONES (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2016/02/texas-abortion-
supreme-court-hb2-scalia-death [https://perma.cc/9X2L-HGKV]. 
 16.  Editorial, The Senate’s Confirmation Shutdown, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/09/opinion/the-senates-confirmation-shutdown.html 
[https://perma.cc/D2PF-AF2M]; David M. Herszenhorn, G.O.P. Senators Say Obama 
Supreme Court Pick Will Be Rejected, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2016), 
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This essay will explain how the conservative justices have used their power of 
judicial review to undermine our democracy. It will then discuss how Scalia’s death 
neutralized the conservative justices’ ability to do further damage in the Supreme 
Court’s most recent term. It will conclude with thoughts about what is at stake in 
choosing Scalia’s successor.        
I. FAILING TO INTERVENE WHEN INTERVENTION IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE A 
HEALTHY DEMOCRACY 
Sometimes legislators abuse their power to enact laws that distort the political 
process for personal and partisan advantage. Two of the most troublesome 
contemporary examples are extreme partisan gerrymandering and voter ID laws. The 
former creates “safe” seats for incumbents so they don’t have to face viable 
competitors in general elections. The latter suppresses voter turnout, especially of 
the poor, the disabled, and the elderly, under the guise of preventing voter fraud.  
These laws call out for judicial intervention. The liberal justices have been 
prepared to use their power of judicial review to check these abuses. The 
conservative justices have been content to let the abuses continue. Fortunately, the 
Court has produced some democracy-reinforcing decisions when Justice Kennedy 
has aligned with the liberal justices.   
A. Failing to Limit Extreme Partisan Gerrymandering 
Partisan gerrymandering is not the only cause of political dysfunction in federal 
and state legislatures. The United States Senate has been torn by partisanship even 
though Senate seats are not subject to gerrymandering.17 And many legislative 
districts would be safe seats even without gerrymandering because citizens have self-
segregated into communities with politically like-minded residents.18 
Nonetheless, many observers believe that extreme partisan gerrymandering has 
produced a hyperpartisanship in legislatures that prevents the type of cross-party 
collaboration required for government to function effectively.19 When so many 
districts are gerrymandered into safe seats—it’s estimated that only 15 out of the 435 
House districts are currently competitive—it makes general elections meaningless 




 17.  Norman J. Ornstein, The Pernicious Effects of Gerrymandering, NAT’L J. DAILY, 
Dec. 3, 2014. 
 18.  Id. (referring to journalist Bill Bishop’s term, the “big sort,” for this tendency of 
Americans to live in communities with like-minded people); see also Political Polarization in 
American Public Life, PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2014), http://www.people-
press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/ [https://perma.cc/G2P6-
KA8K] (liberals prefer denser, walkable communities whereas conservatives prefer larger 
homes in more spread-out communities).   
 19.  Noah Litton, Note, The Road to Better Redistricting: Empirical Analysis and State-
Based Reforms to Counter Partisan Gerrymandering, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 839, 841–42 (2012). 
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and primaries all-important.20 This enhances the power of ideological hardliners in 
both parties, who have disproportionate influence in primaries.21 The result is 
dysfunctional federal and state legislatures composed of politicians who are afraid to 
compromise for fear of alienating their party base.22  
Nothing prevents state legislators from using neutral instead of partisan criteria to 
draw district lines. But this is a situation that the political process is incapable of 
fixing itself. After all, what incumbent would trade a safe district for a competitive 
one? As President Obama rightfully said in his 2016 State of the Union address, 
“we’ve got to end the practice of drawing our congressional districts so that 
politicians can pick their voters, and not the other way around.”23  
  If extreme partisan gerrymandering is harming our democracy and if the political 
process is incapable of fixing it, the situation is ripe for judicial intervention. The 
justices could conclude that extreme judicial gerrymandering violates the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
But the conservative justices, with the exception of Kennedy, have adamantly 
opposed such judicial intervention.24 They have insisted that they lack “manageable 
standards” for identifying unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders and have declared 
the issue to be a nonjusticiable “political question.”25 
The Court’s four liberal justices have been willing to place limits on abusive 
partisan gerrymandering and have proposed standards for identifying illegal 
gerrymanders.26 Justice Stephen Breyer, for example, has said that the Court could 
find an equal protection violation when “purely political ‘gerrymandering’ [fails] to 
advance any plausible democratic objective while simultaneously threatening serious 
democratic harm.”27  
Justice Kennedy has refused to join the other conservative justices in declaring 
partisan gerrymandering nonjusticiable.28 But he has also never ruled a partisan 
gerrymander unconstitutional. Kennedy believes that the Court has not yet developed 
                                                                                                                 
 
 20.  Carl Hulse, Seeking to End Gerrymandering’s Enduring Legacy, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
25, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/26/us/politics/seeking-to-end-gerrymanderings-
enduring-legacy.html [https://perma.cc/Y4BN-KFCZ]. 
 21.  Litton, supra note 19, at 841–42. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 13, 2016). 
 24.  Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 305 (2004) (stating that “neither Article I, §2, nor 
the Equal Protection Clause, nor . . . Article I, §4, provides a judicially enforceable limit on 
the political considerations that the States and Congress may take into account when 
districting”). 
 25.  Id. at 281 (stating that “no judicially discernible and manageable standards for 
adjudicating political gerrymandering claims have emerged”). 
 26.  Id. at 317–42 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 343–55 (Souter, J., dissenting), 355–68 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 27.  Id. at 355 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 28.  Id. at 313 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that the Court should 
not prematurely declare all partisan gerrymandering nonjusticiable in case “suitable standards 
with which to measure the burdens a gerrymander imposes on representational rights” 
ultimately emerge). 
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an adequate test for identifying an unconstitutional gerrymander, but he has left a 
glimmer of hope that the Court someday will.29 
Fortunately, voters in states with a public referendum can use that device to 
bypass state legislators and transfer the redistricting process to an independent 
commission. This has occurred in California and Arizona.30 However, during the 
Supreme Court’s 2014 term there was a danger that the Supreme Court would bar 
voters from using this salutary corrective.31 
The issue was whether the “Elections Clause” in Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 of 
the Constitution delegates the redistricting power exclusively to state legislators so 
that any delegation of this power to the people would be unconstitutional.32 Four of 
the Court’s conservative justices, led by Chief Justice Roberts, wanted to hold that 
the Constitution prohibits such a delegation and thus denies voters the ability to 
prevent gerrymandering by self-interested legislators.33 Thankfully, Kennedy joined 
the liberal justices who interpreted the Constitution to permit redistricting by any 
lawmaking procedure a state allows, including public initiatives.34  
Thus, with the exception of the swing-voting Kennedy, the conservative justices 
have refused to use their power to check the abuses of extreme partisan 
gerrymandering and were even prepared to block voters from addressing this abuse 
themselves. 
B. Failing to Invalidate Voter ID Laws that Suppress Voter Participation 
A healthy democracy fosters voter participation. It also prevents fraudulent 
voting.  
Voter identification laws lie at the crossroads of these two goals. Proponents say 
the laws are essential to prevent voter fraud.35 Opponents say voter fraud is 
exceptionally rare and that the real effect of these laws is to disenfranchise poor, 
elderly, and disabled voters who lack proper identification and the resources to get 
it.36 
The evidence suggests that voter suppression, not voter fraud, is the driving force 
behind these laws. The states that have most aggressively enacted voter ID laws tend 
to be controlled by Republicans who stand to benefit from disenfranchising poor (and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 29.  Id. at 317 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that “[i]f workable 
standards do emerge,” then “courts should be prepared to order relief”). 
 30.  Ornstein, supra note 17 (noting this process occurred in Arizona in 2000 and in 
California in 2008). 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658–
59 (2015). 
 33.  Id. at 2692 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (stating that the Elections Clause does not 
permit the people of Arizona to address their concerns about the state’s redistricting process 
“by displacing their legislature”). 
 34.  Id. at 2677 (concluding that the Election Clause does not hinder the ability of Arizona 
voters “to restore ‘the core principle of republican government,’ namely, ‘that the voters 
should choose their representatives, not the other way around’” (citations omitted)). 
 35.  Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 191 (2008). 
 36.  Id. at 212, 226–29 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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often minority) voters.37 In Pennsylvania, the Republican House Majority Leader 
boasted that the state’s new voter ID law would ensure that Mitt Romney, not Barack 
Obama, would win Pennsylvania in the presidential election.38 The 
Republican-controlled Texas state legislature revealed its partisan hand with its 
quirky rules for which types of identification satisfy the law: concealed-weapon 
permits (Yes!), student ids (No!).39 As Henry David Thoreau observed, “[s]ome 
circumstantial evidence is very strong, as when you find a trout in the milk.”40 
If voter ID laws are truly aimed at suppressing voters for partisan advantage, then 
judicial intervention to curb this abuse is warranted. But the Court’s one decision on 
a voter ID law upheld the law, and, if most of the conservative justices have their 
way, the Court is unlikely to find these laws unconstitutional anytime soon. By 
contrast, the liberal justices are prepared to intervene.  
The leading case is Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, a 2008 decision 
involving a challenge to an Indiana voter ID law.41 The justices did not break cleanly 
along liberal and conservative lines. Justice John Paul Stevens joined the 
conservative justices to uphold the law.  
Stevens’s opinion was narrowly focused on the record before him. He 
acknowledged that voter ID laws could serve a legitimate interest in bolstering public 
confidence “‘in the integrity and legitimacy of representative government.’”42 And 
he found the record lacking in evidence that the Indiana law was disenfranchising 
voters. “[O]n the basis of the record that has been made in this litigation,” he 
concluded, “we cannot conclude that the statute imposes ‘excessively burdensome 
requirements’ on any class of voters.’”43 
Scalia wrote separately to reject the premise that a law could be unconstitutional 
because it “‘imposed a special burden on’ some voters.”44 Unless a law imposed a 
severe burden on all voters or there was evidence of purposeful discrimination 
against a suspect class, the law should be upheld. “It is for state legislatures,” he said, 
“to weigh the costs and benefits of possible changes to their election codes, and their 
                                                                                                                 
 
 37.  See Stephen Ohlemacher, GOP Gerrymandering Creates Uphill Fight for Dems in 
House, PBS NEWSHOUR (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/gop-
gerrymandering-creates-uphill-fight-dems-house/ [https://perma.cc/NP8Y-HB7N]. 
 38.  Aaron Blake, Everything You Need to Know About the Pennsylvania Voter ID Fight, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2102), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2012/10/02/the-pennsylvania-voter-id-fight-explained/ [https://perma.cc/R85U-
KHW9] (quoting Pennsylvania House Majority Leader Mike Turzai: “Voter ID . . . is going 
to allow Governor Romney to win the state of Pennsylvania: done!”). 
 39.  See Rebecca Leber, In Texas, You Can Vote with a Concealed Handgun License—
But Not a Student ID, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 20, 2014), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/119900/texas-voter-id-allows-handgun-licenses-not-student-
ids [https://perma.cc/LZ3K-WHVW]. 
 40.  Russell F. Hillard, Owning Up, Trout in Milk & Other Musings, NEW HAMPSHIRE 
BAR ASS’N (Dec. 19, 2003), (citations omitted) 
https://www.nhbar.org/publications/archives/display-news-issue.asp?id=1384 
[https://perma.cc/3BMD-RQ92]. 
 41.  553 U.S. 181. 
 42.  Id. at 197 (citation omitted). 
 43.  Id. at 202. 
 44.  Id. at 204 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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judgment must prevail unless it imposes a severe and unjustified overall burden upon 
the right to vote, or is intended to disadvantage a particular class.”45 Justices Clarence 
Thomas and Justice Samuel Alito joined Scalia’s opinion. 
Justice David Souter wrote a scathing dissent. He said that the law imposed a 
substantial burden on tens of thousands of poor, elderly, and disabled voters and that 
the legislature’s insistence on the law’s immediate implementation demonstrated its 
lack of interest in trying to mitigate this burden.46 Souter found the State’s competing 
interest in preventing in-person voter fraud to have no “more than a very modest 
significance,” particularly since the State had failed to put forth “a single instance of 
in-person voter impersonation fraud in all of Indiana’s history.”47 He found it utterly 
irrational for anyone to risk the severe criminal sanctions for voter impersonation 
when the only benefit was gaining one more vote for a candidate.48 Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg joined Souter’s dissent.  Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a separate 
dissent to say that he thought the Indiana law imposed a “disproportionate burden” 
upon those who do not have a valid ID.49 
Five years after writing Crawford, the retired Justice Stevens confessed that he 
“[was not] a fan of voter ID” and that his Crawford decision “should not be taken as 
authority that voter ID laws are always OK.”50 In fact, he said, “I have always thought 
that David Souter got the thing correct, but that my own problem with the case was 
that I didn’t think the record supported everything he said in his opinion.”51 But “as 
a matter of actual history,” Stevens said, Souter was “dead right.”52 
Judge Richard Posner, one of the nation’s preeminent federal court of appeals 
judges and author of the lower court decision in Crawford, has similarly come to 
believe that voter ID laws suppress voting rights. Several years after his Crawford 
decision upheld the Indiana law, Posner wrote a blistering dissent when the Seventh 
Circuit refused to grant a rehearing of a panel decision upholding a Wisconsin voter 
ID law. Posner no longer had any illusions about the real purpose of voter ID laws: 
“There is only one motivation for imposing burdens on voting that are ostensibly 
designed to discourage voter-impersonation fraud, if there is no actual danger of such 
fraud, and that is to discourage voting by persons likely to vote against the party 
responsible for imposing the burdens.”53 
Even if Stevens and Posner are correct that voter ID laws are intended to suppress 
votes, it’s unclear whether the Supreme Court will do anything to curb this abuse. 
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito made it clear in Crawford that they had no interest in 
striking down voter ID laws. Roberts’s and Kennedy’s positions are less clear 
because they joined Stevens’s more fact-dependent opinion. But what we do know 
                                                                                                                 
 
 45.  Id. at 208. 
 46.  Id. at 212, 236 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 47.  Id. at 226, 230 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
 48.  Id. at 227-28 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 49.  Id. at 237 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 50.  Jess Bravin, Voter-ID Laws Worry Jurist, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 17, 2013), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304384104579141701228734132 
[https://perma.cc/6VMG-9H6Y].    
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Frank v. Walker, 773 F.3d 783, 796 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., dissenting). 
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is that the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case involving the Wisconsin voter 
ID law and thereby left in place the original Seventh Circuit panel decision upholding 
the Wisconsin law.54 
II. INTERVENING TO INVALIDATE LEGITIMATE EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE 
DEMOCRATIC PROCESS 
The conservative justices’ failure to use their power of judicial review to check 
legislative actions that harm our democracy is disturbing. It is even more disturbing 
that these same justices have actively used their power to strike down benign laws 
that improved our democracy. We had a glimpse of this in the last section, which 
discussed the conservative justices’ efforts to preclude voters from using public 
referenda to ameliorate the problem of extreme partisan gerrymandering. This 
section discusses two especially troubling examples of conservative justices 
invalidating beneficial laws that had made our democracy stronger: their invalidation 
of Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act and their persistent overturning of regulatory 
limits on campaign expenditures. 
A. Invalidating the Voting Rights Act’s Preclearance Regime 
For fifty years, the preclearance rules in Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act 
provided a critical check against voting laws that disadvantaged minority groups.55  
The rules required that any changes to a state’s voting laws be precleared by the 
federal government before they could be implemented.56  
In an ideal world, these preclearance rules would apply to election law changes in 
all fifty states. But the rules apply only to “covered jurisdictions,” which were 
defined through a formula in Section 4 of the Act.57  These covered jurisdictions 
consisted mostly of states in the “old South” with a long history of discrimination 
against African-American voters.58 
In addition to the preclearance procedure, the Voting Rights Act authorizes 
lawsuits against any jurisdiction for actions that discriminate against minority 
voters.59 These “Section 2” lawsuits can be used to challenge discriminatory voting 
laws anywhere in the country, but as a practical matter, they are a less effective 
deterrent than the preclearance procedure because lawsuits are slow and expensive 
and the burden of proof lies with the challengers.60 By contrast, the preclearance rules 
                                                                                                                 
 
 54.  Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1551 (2015). 
 55.  Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2634 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(describing the Voting Rights Act as “one of the most consequential, efficacious and amply 
justified exercises of federal legislative power in our Nation’s history,” and in particular 
highlighting the importance of the Act’s federal preclearance procedure). 
 56.  Id. at 2620. 
 57.  Id. at 2619. 
 58.  Id. at 2620. 
 59.  Id. at 2619. 
 60.  Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The South After Shelby County, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 55, 
63–65. 
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prevent laws from being enacted until they are first approved, and the burden is on 
states to show that the laws will not have a discriminatory effect.61 
The preclearance procedure has been a bulwark against discriminatory voting 
laws. But the regime came crashing down in 2013 when the Supreme Court, in Shelby 
County v. Holder, invalidated the formula for identifying covered jurisdictions.62 
Chief Justice Roberts, who wrote the majority opinion, said the formula was badly 
outdated and could wrongfully classify states as “covered jurisdictions” even if they 
were no longer guilty of widespread discrimination against minority voters.63 
Without evidence of current discrimination, Roberts said, Congress had no power to 
force these states to “beseech” the federal government for permission to change their 
election laws.64 Roberts said this was an affront to the “dignity” of the states and, 
because the rule applied to only to some states, a violation of the “fundamental 
principle of equal sovereignty” among the states.65  Roberts’s opinion was joined by 
the Court’s four other conservative justices. All of the liberal justices dissented. 
Perhaps Roberts was right that the formula for identifying covered jurisdictions 
was outdated (although Justice Ginsburg fiercely argued to the contrary in her 
dissent).66 But Roberts was wrong to think that the Court needed to overturn the 
formula in order to protect the rights of states subject to the preclearance rules. This 
is a perfect example of something that does not require judicial intervention because 
states are perfectly capable of protecting themselves through the political process. 
Indeed, the constitutional framework, and particularly the existence of the U.S. 
Senate, is designed to give states a voice in the political process.67 Yet when the 
Voting Rights Act came up for reauthorization in 2006, ninety-eight Senators voted 
in favor of it and none opposed it.68 Senators from the covered jurisdictions could 
have opposed the reauthorization if they thought it was an affront to the “dignity” 
and “equality” of their states. None did. Perhaps Roberts should have been more 
concerned with the dignity and equality of voters, whose rights were jeopardized by 
his decision, than with the dignity and equality of states.  
Indeed, by invalidating the formula for identifying covered states, Roberts gave a 
green light to the formerly covered jurisdictions to start enacting voter-suppressive 
laws. Texas, Mississippi, Alabama, North Carolina, and several counties in Georgia 
promptly followed the Court’s lead and enacted a series of laws to deter voting by 
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poor and minority voters.69 Not surprisingly, civil rights leaders called Shelby “the 
single biggest setback” to civil rights since the Voting Rights Act was enacted in 
1965.70 
Fortunately, civil rights lawyers have had remarkable success in challenging some 
of the more egregious post-Shelby laws.71 Courts have enjoined the implementation 
of laws in Texas, North Carolina, Wisconsin, North Dakota, and Ohio.72 Election law 
scholar Richard Hasen has speculated that these victories might have been 
short-lived if Justice Scalia was still on the Supreme Court and there was a 
five-conservative-justice majority willing to overturn these rulings.73 “A Donald 
Trump presidency,” Hasen warned, “could lead to the appointment of more justices 
in the model of Justice Scalia (as Mr. Trump has promised), reversing these gains.”74 
B. Striking Down Laws that Curb the Influence of Money in Politics 
The conservative justices’ repeated invalidation of campaign finance laws is their 
best-known blow to our democracy’s health. Many fear we are becoming an 
oligarchy, or at least the best democracy money can buy.75 Nor is this fear unjustified. 
Political scientists have recently shown through empirical evidence that affluent 
Americans have been far more likely to have their legislative preferences enacted 
into law than lower and middle-class Americans, even though the latter make up the 
vast majority of the population.76 
  The flaws with the Supreme Court’s campaign finance decisions are not the ones 
found on liberal bumper stickers. The Court was not wrong to think that corporations 
sometimes have constitutional rights. If it were otherwise, the government could 
seize all of Apple’s assets without it being a “taking” of property, and the government 
could break into Apple’s headquarters without a warrant. Free speech rights would 
also be in jeopardy if media corporations like The New York Times were ineligible 
for First Amendment protection. 
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The Court was also not wrong to say that regulating money implicates the First 
Amendment. It’s true that money is not the same as speech, but money is often 
needed to communicate. No one would think that the government could tell The New 
York Times editors what to put in their newspaper. But surely it would be equally 
problematic if the government told the editors not to spend more than $20,000 on 
publishing the paper. 
None of this is to deny that the reasoning in the campaign finance cases is 
seriously flawed. The first flaw is the conservative justices’ assumption that 
independent expenditures do not create a risk of corruption. All along, the Court has 
permitted financial limits on contributions given directly to candidates because these 
are necessary “to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption.”77  But from the 
beginning, the conservative justices have assumed that independent expenditures 
pose no risk of corruption because they cannot be coordinated with a candidate’s 
campaign.78  
This distinction between independent expenditures and direct contributions might 
make sense in some make-believe world, but in the real world, it is hopelessly naïve. 
Candidates know which parties make independent expenditures on their behalf, and, 
as with direct contributors, feel beholden to those parties.79 And while it may be true 
that independent expenditures cannot be coordinated with the campaign, it is 
common knowledge that this coordination happens anyway, even if done covertly.80 
Not uncommonly, the people running the independent PACs formerly worked for a 
candidate and know full well how to act in lockstep with the candidate’s campaign 
strategy.81 This type of covert coordination is such an open secret that Stephen 
Colbert, with the advice a campaign finance lawyer, hired John Stewart to run his 
independent PAC when Colbert ran for president.82 The lawyer explained that 
Stewart could spend unlimited sums on Colbert’s behalf as long as the two of them 
didn’t “coordinate.”83 Colbert and Stewart giggled like little boys who suddenly 
realized they could cheat without getting caught.84 
The second major flaw is the conservative justices’ assumption that leveling the 
speech playing field can never be a legitimate governmental interest. Their mantra is 
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that it is anathema to the First Amendment to limit one party’s speech to enhance the 
relative voice of another.85 Again, this sounds good in theory. But it makes little 
sense when ten percent of the American population controls seventy-six percent of 
the nation’s wealth, and when, in the current presidential campaign season, 158 
families out of America’s 120 million households provided half of the early 
campaign financing.86  
In other marketplaces we recognize the dangers of monopoly power and regulate 
to control it. Perhaps the marketplace of ideas needs similar regulation. But any hope 
for that was dashed when the conservative justices in Citizens United granted 
corporations a constitutional right to spend unlimited sums of shareholder money on 
“independent” expenditures. 
The liberal justices have consistently dissented in these campaign financing 
decisions, writing passionate dissents about the destructive influence of money on 
our political system.87 But time and again, the conservative justices have used their 
power of judicial review to invalidate campaign expenditure limits.  
III. JUSTICE SCALIA’S PASSING AVERTED THE RISK OF FURTHER DAMAGE IN THE 
SUPREME COURT’S LAST TERM 
The conservative justices’ onslaught on our democratic system was poised to 
continue in the Supreme Court’s last term. But Justice Scalia’s passing derailed their 
agenda. The two cases in which the conservatives were most likely to have done 
further damage to our democracy are discussed below. 
A. Undermining Public Unions under the Guise of Protecting Employee Free 
Speech 
Conservative pundits liked to say that Citizens United was equally beneficial for 
liberals and conservatives. After all, the Court not only said that corporations could 
spend unlimited sums on campaign expenditures, but also said that unions could.88 
                                                                                                                 
 
 85.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976) (concluding that “restrict[ing] the speech 
of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly 
foreign to the First Amendment”); see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. 
Ct. 876, 921 (2010) (Roberts, C.J, concurring).  
 86.  OECD, IN IT TOGETHER 250 (2015), http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-
Management/oecd/employment/in-it-together-why-less-inequality-benefits-
all_9789264235120-en#page249 [https://perma.cc/ER8M-M9CD] (chart indicating that the 
top ten percent of United States households own seventy-six percent of the nation’s wealth); 
Nicholas Confessore, Sarah Cohen & Karen Yourish, The Families Funding the 2016 
Presidential Election, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/10/11/us/politics/2016-presidential-election-super-
pac-donors.html [https://perma.cc/9GFA-9UUG]. 
 87.  Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 929–82 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
 88.  Hans A. von Spakovsky, Citizens United and the Restoration of the First Amendment, 
HERITAGE (Feb. 17, 2010), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/02/citizens-united-
and-the-restoration-of-the-first-amendment [https://perma.cc/Q5SY-TAYH] (emphasizing 
the right of unions to spend money on political campaigns). 
2016] HOW CONSERVATIVE JUDGES ARE UNDERMINGING OUR DEMOCRACY 73 
 
This is reminiscent of Anatole France’s famous observation that “[t]he law, in its 
majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg 
in the streets, and to steal bread.”89 Union resources have always been miniscule 
compared to corporate resources.90 But, making matters worse, union membership 
has been in steep decline for the past half century. 
Fifty years ago, one of every three American nonagricultural workers belonged to 
a union.91 Today, one of ten does.92 Of course, globalization and technological 
changes have disrupted both corporations and unions. But the manner in which 
corporations have responded to these changes—outsourcing manufacturing jobs to 
lower-wage countries and replacing people with machines—has devastated the 
workforce that formed the mainstay of the labor movement.93 Hardest hit has been 
the private sector where only 6.6% of the workforce is currently unionized.94 
The one bright star in the labor universe is the public sector. Unionization of 
federal, state, and local government employees remains relatively robust (ranging 
from 27.5 to 42 percent).95 But in its most recent term, the Supreme Court threatened 
to strike a potentially fatal blow to public sector unions in the name of freedom of 
speech. The case concerned the objections of non-union-member employees to 
paying for a union’s collective bargaining services.96 
 State and local governments are not required to recognize unions, but most do so 
if the majority of employees join a union.97 When this occurs, the law promotes 
fairness and efficiency by requiring the union to represent all employees in the 
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bargaining unit.98 If the union wins higher wages or more generous health benefits, 
union members and nonmembers alike receive these benefits.99 
Since nonmembers enjoy the benefits of collective bargaining, many states 
require them to pay their fair share of the union’s costs.100 In the past, this sometimes 
meant paying the equivalent of full union dues.101 But in a landmark decision in 1977, 
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, the Supreme Court held that this requirement 
violated the nonmembers’ free speech rights.102 
Abood said that nonmembers could be required to pay for a union’s collective 
bargaining expenses.103 But they could not be forced to pay for other union expenses, 
especially the costs of a union’s political activities.104 The latter violated the 
nonmembers’ First Amendment rights because it forced the nonmembers to subsidize 
speech they might not support or might even find objectionable.105 
This compromise—forcing nonmembers to pay for collective bargaining services 
but not political activities—has been the guiding principle for almost four decades. 
But in the case before the Supreme Court, employees who benefited from union 
representation but did not want to pay union dues were objecting to paying even 
collective bargaining expenses.106 They said that collective bargaining by public 
unions is also a form of political speech because it has profound political 
ramifications (such as how governments allocate scarce taxpayer money).107 They 
contended that forcing them to subsidize this “speech” violates their rights.108  
After the oral argument in the case, commentators predicted Abood’s demise. The 
five conservative justices appeared ready to overrule Abood while the four liberals 
seemed inclined to uphold it.109  
Overturning Abood would have been a body blow to the last remaining vestige of 
union power. But with Scalia no longer on the Court, the conservatives lost their 
majority and the Court split 4–4.110 This did not set any national precedent, and it left 
in effect the Ninth Circuit decision upholding the California law requiring 
fee-sharing by non-union employees. 
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B. Construing One-Person, One-Vote to Shift Power from Urban to Rural Areas 
Perhaps the most important democracy-reinforcing decision in Supreme Court 
history was Reynolds v. Sims, which established the rule that state legislative districts 
had to be apportioned based on the principle of one-person, one-vote.111 The Court 
has applied the same rule to congressional districts.112 
Historically, the states have applied the one-person, one-vote rule by counting all 
of their residents.113 In other words, they would take the total number of residents 
reported in the last decennial census and divide that by the number of legislative 
districts they needed to create.114 
But in a case heard by the Supreme Court in its last term, the plaintiffs claimed 
that one-person, one-vote meant equality of voters, not people.115 This would mean 
that, in drawing district lines, states would not count citizens who cannot vote (such 
as children and ex-felons who had been disenfranchised) or resident aliens who are 
living in the country legally.116 Depending on how they defined “voters,” they might 
not even count citizens who are eligible to vote but not registered.  
Which approach—counting all residents or only eligible voters—would best 
further the democracy-reinforcing purpose of Reynolds v. Sims? There is no one right 
answer. But certainly one would think that the relative weight of any legislative 
district should account for the fact that there are children and ex-felons living there. 
Even if these groups do not vote, they are members of the body politic and deserve 
to have their interests represented.  
After the Supreme Court took the case, Richard Hasen warned that the plaintiffs 
might have been less concerned with finding a principled application of the 
one-person, one-vote rule than with pulling off a partisan “Republican power 
grab.”117 Indeed, if the Court had transformed the Reynolds rule from one-person, 
one-vote to one-voter, one-vote, it would have shifted political power away from 
more liberal Democratic urban districts, which tend to have more children, aliens, 
and ex-felons, to more conservative Republican rural areas.118 
With Scalia off the Court, any possibility of the Court adopting a one-voter, 
one-vote rule disappeared. The Court instead issued a narrow decision that merely 
held that states could draw districts based on total population.119 Justice Ginsburg’s 
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opinion for the Court, which was joined by five justices including the conservatives 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy, concluded that constitutional history, the 
Court’s precedent, and settled practices all supported the propriety of using total 
population.120 The Court declined to consider the more incendiary issue of whether 
states could instead choose to draw district lines to equalize voter population.121   
Even if Scalia had remained on the Court, it’s hard to know how this case would 
have been resolved. It’s quite possible the justices would have punted on the one-
voter, one-vote issue, perhaps leaving it to the states to decide. As a practical matter, 
that might have been the only choice, since basing districts on voters opens a 
Pandora’s Box of intractable problems (e.g., the census doesn’t count voters, some 
states have same-day voter registration, a whole generation of children would 
become eligible to vote between one census and the next).122 For now, all we know 
is that the issue was put off to another day and presumably to a differently constituted 
Court.   
CONCLUSION 
The Constitution begins with the words “We the People” to emphasize that our 
nation is based on popular sovereignty. Of course, the Constitution, itself a counter-
majoritarian document, places limits on the popular will to protect minority rights. 
But ordinarily, our system of government is one in which the majority of citizens, 
acting though their elected representatives, set the nation’s course. 
Such a system works only if the machinery of democracy is responsive to the 
popular will. Yet time and again, the conservative justices have allowed lawmakers 
to tamper with this machinery to entrench themselves in office and to disenfranchise 
voters who threaten their power. The justices’ refusal to correct for these abuses has 
largely redounded to the benefit of the Republican Party because Republicans control 
the majority of the state legislatures and have used their power to draw partisan-
gerrymandered districts and to aggressively enact voter ID and other laws that 
disenfranchise poor and minority voters. 
The conservative justices have been able to facilitate this partisan manipulation 
because there has been a reliable majority of five conservative justices on the 
Supreme Court. But Justice Scalia’s unexpected passing during the term of a 
Democratic president put that control into play. The mainstream media has focused 
on the implications of a potentially shifting Supreme Court majority for individual 
rights. But it’s hard to imagine that, behind the scenes, politicians are not more 
focused on the implications of a shifting majority for their ability to hold onto power. 
Is it any wonder that Republican Senators interpreted the Constitution’s command 
to give “Advice and Consent” to authorize obstruction and evasion?123 
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